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The European policy of the forthcoming German government is bound to 
change, partly as a result of the new institutional framework. On the one 
hand there is the ruling of the German Constitutional Court. And on the 
other hand it will become necessary to play by the EU’s new rules of the 
game. Can Germany continue to support the trend to more European in-
tegration and, more importantly, will it have a desire to do so? 
Whoever becomes the next Chancellor of 
Germany will have to get used to new 
rules of the game in the area of European 
policy. They have been determined in two 
different ways. On the one hand the ruling 
of the German Constitutional Court on the 
Treaty of Lisbon redistributes the tasks 
assigned to various German institutions. 
And on the other hand the Treaty itself–if, 
that is, the Irish give their assent to it on 
02 October, for otherwise there will be a 
need for crisis management for years to 
come–will change the distribution of 
power in Brussels, partly on account of the 
creation of new posts ranging from the 
permanent President of the European 
Council to the EU foreign policy represen-
tative, and, more importantly, on account 
of the enhancement of the rights of EU 
parliaments and citizens. 
I 
The Ruling in Karlsruhe – 
Criticism and Praise  
The Karlsruhe ruling on 30 June 2009 led 
to fierce disputes in Germany and else-
where among those who sought to   
elucidate its meaning. Writing in the 
weekly newspaper “Die Zeit,” former   
foreign minister Joschka Fischer criticized 
the fact that it placed “national   
constraints” on European integration. 
“Karlsruhe simply does not like the EU’s 
progress towards deeper integration,” 
writes Fischer. The Second Senate of the 
Constitutional Court “had attacked the 
phantasmagoric vision of a European   
‘federal state’ merely in order to lend   
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legitimacy to its view that in future Euro-
pean integration policy would not be   
formulated in Berlin by democratically   
legitimated bodies, that is, the German 
government, the German Parliament and 
the Federal Council, but by the court in 
Karlsruhe.” 
 
In the Süddeutsche Zeitung Alfred 
Grosser, the doyen of French experts on 
Germany, commented: “The German Con-
stitutional Court exists and issues its   
rulings in an atmosphere in which it fears 
that it will have to defer to the European 
Court of Justice.” Without mentioning any 
names, he cites French eurosceptics who 
can now say with a vengeance: “The   
Germans were never serious about Europe 
after all.” 
 
In the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
Carl Otto Lenz, for many years a member 
of parliament and subsequently advocate 
general at the European Court of Justice in 
Luxembourg, criticized both the letter and 
the spirit of the Karlsruhe ruling. “The   
Basic Law never employs the term   
“sovereign,” whereas the German Consti-
tutional Court uses it thirty-three times.” 
Lenz is also of the opinion that the highest 
German court is arrogating to itself a   
political role: “The current state of affairs 
is deemed to be the end of the chapter, the 
development of the law is taken out of the 
hands of the elected bodies, in the name of 
democracy. The message is thus far and no 
farther.” 
 
To be sure, the Karlsruhe ruling was also 
greeted with approval. On the one hand, of 
course, because the court declared that 
ratifying the Treaty of Lisbon was conso-
nant with the constitution. And on the 
other hand because, as Herbert Prantl 
pointed out in the Süddeutsche Zeitung, 
this was a “great moment for Europe.” 
“This ruling does not seek to find fault 
with Europe, it does not harp on about its 
deficits, but spells out how Europe can be 
improved in a positive way.” Prantl 
praised the outcome: “The members of   
parliament will have to think far more 
about Europe than they have in the past. 
In other words, Europe will become a   
domestic policy issue. (…) The ruling   
condemns the German Parliament to more 
democracy.” 
 
More democracy is also what Burkhard 
Hirsch, a former deputy speaker of the 
German Parliament, expects to see. “If the 
court makes certain that the parliamentary 
majority and the German government have 
to respect the Basic Law, then that is not 
democracy shaped by the judiciary, but 
urgently needed protection for the consti-
tution,” Hirsch writes in the Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung. “It is also not true 
that a government’s “hands are bound” if  
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it is tied to the decisions of the parliament. 
I thought that a parliamentary government 
was always bound to abide by the   
decisions of the parliament. That is what it 
says in the Basic Law.” 
 
II 
New Distribution of  
Power in Germany’s  
European Policy 
In future the German Parliament and the 
Federal Council will be in a position   
(according to the Karlsruhe court it will in 
fact be their duty) to determine the way 
the German government votes in Brussels 
when the issue is an amendment to an EU 
treaty, the voting regulations, or an exten-
sion of responsibilities. In essence the new 
law makes use of the so-called bridging 
clause in the Treaty of Lisbon. The Euro-
pean Council, that is, the body which 
represents the 27 EU governments, can 
decide unanimously that henceforth the 
majority principle will be used in certain 
policy areas. In order to give its assent to 
this procedure the German government 
will in future need to secure the approval 
of the Bundestag, and on top of this, where 
state rights are affected, of the Bundesrat  
(Federal Council). 
 
This is only an (admittedly central) exam-
ple of what in future awaits every Chancel-
lor on the European level. The new rules of 
the game as stipulated by Karlsruhe will at 
any rate have two consequences. On the 
one hand the German government will find 
European policy  (more) complicated. On 
the other hand, debates in the Bundestag 
and the Bundesrat will be Europeanized. 
This will continue to be the case as long as 
the European Union is neither a federal 
state nor a confederation, but a political 
entity of a unique kind. It remains to be 
seen what the participants will make of all 
this, whether efficiency and transparency 
will suffer, whether the democratic debate 
will become more passionate and to the 
point, and whether, indeed, Germany   
becomes more European, or Europe more 
German. 
 
Be that as it may, every Chancellor will 
have to bear in mind another consequence 
of the Karlsruhe ruling. The hitherto latent 
conflict between the German Constitu-
tional Court and the European Court of 
Justice can become a crisis and shift to the 
level of open hostility at any time. Thomas 
Oppermann, an expert on European law in 
Tübingen, believes that “a war” between 
Karlsruhe and Luxembourg is in the   
offing. Writing in the Frankfurter   
Allgemeine Zeitung his Berlin colleague 
Christian Calliess voiced the opinion that 
the ruling meant that Brussels and Berlin 
were already “under the complete supervi-
sion of Karlsruhe.” “It would cover not 
only the EU and the European Court of   
Justice, but the whole of Germany’s future 
European policy. There are good reasons 
why the German Constitutional Court has 
asked the German Parliament to assume 
responsibility for integration, but in fact 
this would be largely a non-event, for the 
upshot would be a monopoly in the hands 
of Karlsruhe.” 
 
 
III 
On the Way to a republic 
run by judges? 
Inasmuch as the judges of the Constitu-
tional Court give themselves the right to 
have the final word in all questions   
pertaining to the EU, they fit rather neatly 
into the role which former constitutional 
judge and German president Roman 
Herzog advocated in an essay a year ago. 
His motto is “Stop the European Court of 
Justice.” And for this purpose “the estab-
lishment of an independent court for   
competence questions over which the ECJ 
has no jurisdiction is urgently needed.” 
This highest of all courts is now being   
created in Karlsruhe as a result of its   
comprehensive control proviso. For many 
reasons such a proviso seems to be rather  
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questionable, and not all of them are   
connected with Europe. 
 
Martin Nettesheim, the Tübingen expert 
on constitutional law, quite rightly   
believes that there is a claim to absolute 
validity at work here “which contradicts 
the constitutional notion of good compet-
ing arguments.” Robert Leicht believes 
that the explanation of the ruling signifies 
a fundamental change of direction which 
reaches out far beyond the intellectual 
confines of the court. The hard centre of 
the Karlsruhe message as Leicht sees it is 
“We want a German Europe–at least for all 
the forthcoming stages in its develop-
ment.” “For everything else there will be a 
German veto, which in practice we   
ourselves can overcome only by adopting a 
new constitution.” 
 
However, until the German people decide 
in favour of the revolutionary adoption of a 
new constitution, the German judges have 
it in their power to defuse the looming 
democratic and perhaps even European 
crises. To this end the judges, before   
issuing a ruling on European questions 
would merely ask for a prior opinion from 
the European Court of Justice in the frame-
work of a reference for a preliminary   
ruling. Other high and supreme courts,   
including German ones, have long since 
availed themselves of this possibility. 
“Sovereignty and  
democracy are not  
inseparable twins.” 
The Luxembourg arguments will have be 
considered if an open confrontation with 
far-reaching political consequences is to 
be avoided. But European law expert   
Calliess is sceptical whether the Karlsruhe 
judges are still prepared to do this in view 
of the fact that the ruling on the Treaty of 
Lisbon “does not mention ‘the cooperative 
relationship with the ECJ’ emphasized by 
the Maastricht ruling, which is certainly 
not accidental.” 
 
 
The forthcoming German government must 
be prepared for the fact that such a   
conflict will occur in the very near future. 
Two important cases which have a bearing 
on European law and European policy–EU 
data retention and the Honeywell/Mangold 
dispute–are due to be dealt with shortly by 
the highest German court. The rulings will 
demonstrate Karlsruhe’s view of the limits 
of the ECJ’s powers. 
 
IV 
Redefining sovereignty 
Sovereignty, borders, identity–these key 
words in the explanation of the Karlsruhe 
ruling are actually concepts of states and 
nations in the 19th and 20th centuries 
when Europe still ruled half of the world. 
The judges of the German Constitutional 
Court write, speak and think in terms of 
these concepts in an innocent kind of way, 
and do not for a moment think about the 
fact that the individual states of Europe 
can only safeguard and defend their   
self-determination and sovereignty in the 
maelstrom of the 21st century by acting 
together, that is, in European terms.   
Brussels is not a threat; it is the saviour of 
all that remains of the fantasy idea of 
“sovereignty.” Thus it was quite right to 
say that the judges had a romantic   
approach to reality. 
 
Furthermore, sovereignty and democracy 
are certainly not the inseparable twins 
which the Karlsruhe ruling makes them 
out to be. Tsarist Russia and the French 
and German empires wished to dazzle   
others as sovereign states in the 19th-
century concert of powers, but certainly 
did not want to become democratic in the 
process. 
 
The explanation of the ruling of the   
Constitutional Court states correctly that 
“Institutions and procedures will also be 
reformed by the Treaty of Lisbon.” The 
European Parliament will have more 
rights; there will be the newly created   
office of a permanent President of the  
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European Council; the “High Representa-
tive of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy” will combine in one   
person the tasks (and jobs) of the EU   
Commission and the High Representative 
(who is attached to the Council of Minis-
ters). In the Council voting on the basis of 
qualified majorities will become the rule, 
and those who no longer wish to be   
members can leave the EU. Eurojust and 
Europol will receive new rights in the area 
of criminal prosecution. And the treaty 
will enable EU citizens to approach   
Brussels directly with the help of a   
qualified petition. 
 
In short, here again 
the forthcoming   
German government 
will have to get used 
to new rules. Such 
innovations may   
actually seem less 
dramatic than the 
ruling of the   
Constitutional Court, 
especially since every 
minister and every 
Chancellor will in fact 
be dealing with 
familiar institutions, 
the Parliament, the 
Commission, and the 
Council. Furthermore, 
in the course of the 
transition from the 
(abortive) constitu-
tional treaty to the 
Treaty of Lisbon all 
the symbols such as 
the anthem, flag and 
motto which would 
have given the   
European Union the 
flavour of a federal 
state (at least that is 
how the British and 
Dutch saw it, who 
clamoured to have 
them removed) were 
expunged from the 
text.   
Thus for a long time to come the Union 
will clearly continue to be an entity which 
cannot be described with the help of terms 
such as confederation, federal state or   
nation-state. The reformed EU will   
certainly be more political and more   
visible. Some fear that it will also be more 
dominant. And for this reason it will more 
than ever become a force to be reckoned 
with which politicians in EU capitals will 
utilize, but also fear. 
 
The heads of state and government already 
had a foretaste of this in the summer. The 
Council’s attempt to secure a second    
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period of office for the President of the 
Commission, José Manuel Barroso, was 
unsuccessful because it did not receive the 
assent of the newly elected European   
Parliament. In this a political opposition 
group consisting of Socialists, Liberals, 
Greens and Ultra-leftists played a role, as 
did the legal question of whether the next 
President of the Commission, after his   
appointment by the Council, should be 
elected by the Parliament on the basis of a 
simple majority (which is the provision 
contained in the Treaty of Nice) or an   
absolute majority (which is the provision 
contained in the Treaty of Lisbon). 
 
V 
What is on the agenda  
in Brussels? 
The new European Parliament has been 
elected and has got down to work. It is a 
moot point whether the new President of 
the Commission should be chosen in the 
autumn on the basis of the old treaties or 
whether the EU should wait until the 
Treaty of Lisbon can enter into force after 
the Irish referendum and the completion of 
the German, Czech and Polish ratification 
procedures. 
 
This would mean that for all new appoint-
ments there would be a waiting period   
until the year 2010, an interim interval 
which in the world economic crisis is a 
luxury Europe simply cannot afford. On 
top of this the EU in the immediate future 
faces a series of important debates and   
decisions. At the end of September the   
G 20 group is meeting in Pittsburgh in   
order to create a stable and sensible 
framework for banks and the finance   
industry. The results will subsequently 
have to be incorporated into European law.  
 
In December decisions will be made in   
Copenhagen on global climate policy and 
the continuation of the so-called Kyoto 
process. In this area the EU believes that 
it has a leading role to play. In the first 
semester under the Spanish presidency of 
the Council the EU will decide to continue 
with the Lisbon process, and with regard 
to the labour market, growth, the knowl-
edge society and the social community 
embark on a (hopefully) ambitious social 
sustainability project. Next year the   
debate on the framework budget for 2013 
to 2020 will start to heat up. On what 
should the EU spend its money in order to 
ensure its survival in the future, how 
much should it spend, and who should get 
it? Whatever happens, the EU sustainabil-
ity strategy will certainly have to be   
revised. 
 
So there is no dearth of topics when it 
comes to improving the EU as it competes 
with other centres of power in the world. 
There are also plenty of topics for the 
Commission in Brussels to get its teeth 
into, since it will have to come up with 
ideas for these debates and decisions. 
There are also plenty of topics for the 
European Parliament, which in the recent 
past has demonstrated, for example, with 
regard to the Reach chemical substances 
directive, that it is capable of finding solu-
tions to difficult questions. Finally, there 
is plenty of work for the forthcoming 
President of the European Council who in 
all these areas is supposed to mediate and 
broker compromises between the 27   
governments.  
 
And there is a plethora of tasks waiting for 
the next German government, for the   
largest economy in the EU, whether it 
likes it or not, exercises a decisive   
influence on the way things happen. When 
it comes to the climate-friendly automotive 
industry of the future, to infrastructure or 
budgetary issues, people will look not only 
towards Brussels, but also to Berlin. 
 
In a paradoxical kind of way the increased 
integration introduced by the Treaty of 
Lisbon will change nothing. The fact that 
the EU, after two decades of institutional 
debates, has finally and for the foreseeable 
future attained to an internal balance is 
the precise reason why content-specific  
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dossiers and what Barroso has called the 
“Europe of results” have now moved into 
the limelight. This is a state of affairs to 
which, and in the light of the Karlsruhe 
ruling, not only the German government 
will have to adapt, but also the German 
Parliament and the Federal Council. There 
will be a completely unwonted and   
unfamiliar Europeanization of German 
politics. To be sure, not in the way   
envisaged by the euphoric individuals who 
used to greet every step towards greater  
integration as the beginning of the end of 
the nation-state. In the enlarged EU this 
species started to become rather rare quite 
a long time ago. In 2006 former Belgian 
Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt was the 
last prominent politician to give enthusi-
astic support to the idea of “The United 
States of Europe” (the title of his book). He  
remained a voice crying in the wilderness 
to whom few people were prepared to   
listen. 
 
What we shall see is a Europeanization of 
German politics from within, that is, a   
Europeanization of German domestic   
policy in regard to material decisions in 
very different areas ranging from   
agriculture to the environment and from 
foreign policy to justice. The parliaments 
can no longer avoid all this by consigning 
the issues concerned to a European   
committee.  
 
Thus the debates will become more   
controversial, which is not a bad thing. But 
does that mean they will be on a higher 
level? Will they explain Europe in a more 
comprehensible and appropriate manner 
than on so many occasions in the past? 
And does it mean that German politicians 
will immediately be more European? 
 
VI 
European personnel  
required in Germany 
We should perhaps ask the question   
differently. Do the parties have the right 
personnel for this transformational   
challenge? In the parliaments at any rate 
the tone nowadays is set by the domestic 
policy budget specialists and legal experts. 
Foreign policy experts are few and far be-
tween in all of the parties, which in fact 
attach little importance to preparing their 
up-and-coming members to deal with 
European or even global challenges. If a 
young politician wishes to get ahead, it is 
most unlikely that he will become a   
European affairs specialist. It remains to 
be seen what consequences this will have 
in the immediate future for the European-
ized work in both chambers. 
“Europe of results is once 
again in the limelight.”  
In the past a quite different personnel   
debate used to flare up at the beginning of 
every new coalition in Germany. Does the 
government need a powerful Minister for 
Europe in the Chancellor’s Office? A   
sensible question, and a head-on attack on 
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and its   
incumbent, the Vice-Chancellor and   
Minister for Foreign Affairs. In the final 
analysis every Chancellor since Helmut 
Kohl has preferred to leave the question 
unanswered for the sake of peace and 
quiet. However, it should be asked and 
scrutinized once again after the elections. 
In factual terms the answer after the 
Karlsruhe ruling and in the era of the 
Treaty of Lisbon is obvious. If German 
politics is going to become Europeanized 
in such a far-reaching way, then it needs a 
Minister for Europe even if it has been the 
German custom to assign greater impor-
tance to coalition logic than to functional 
logic. 
 
Hitherto German parties and German   
governments concurred that Europe is in 
the national interest, indeed, that   
Germany’s national interest and Europe 
are one. Doubts about this have arisen as a 
result of the Karlsruhe ruling. Alfred 
Grosser is sceptical, and so is the British 
Liberal and MEP Andrew Duff. “One can 
only imagine how Angela Merkel will take  
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to being hobbled in the European Council 
by her judges and MPs back home.”   
However, that would be a high price for 
the Europeanization of German policymak-
ing which has now begun. It would have to 
be paid by Germany and the European   
Union, and would be to the detriment of 
both of them.  
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